Abstract. Client puzzles have been proposed as a useful mechanism for mitigating Denial of Service attacks on network protocols. While several puzzles have been proposed in recent years, most existing nonparallelizable puzzles are based on modular exponentiations. The main drawback of these puzzles is in the high cost that they incur on the puzzle generator (the verifier). In this paper, we propose cryptographic puzzles based on modular exponentiation that reduce this overhead. Our constructions are based on a reasonable intractability assumption in RSA: essentially the difficulty of computing a small private exponent when the public key is larger by several orders of magnitude than the semi-prime modulus. We also discuss puzzle constructions based on CRT-RSA [11] . Given a semi-prime modulus N , the costs incurred on the verifier in our puzzle are decreased by a factor of |N | k when compared to existing modular exponentiation puzzles, where k is a security parameter. We further show how our puzzle can be integrated in a number of protocols, including those used for the remote verification of computing performance of devices and for the protection against Denial of Service attacks. We validate the performance of our puzzle on PlanetLab nodes.
Introduction
Client Puzzles are tightly coupled with Proof of Work systems in which a client (prover) needs to demonstrate to a puzzle generator (verifier) that it has expended a certain level of computational effort in a specified interval of time. Client puzzles found their application in a number of domains, but their main applications concerned their use in the protection against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks [43, 45, 49] and in the verification of computing performance [13, 44] .
To be useful in practice, client puzzles have to satisfy several criteria: namely, they need to be inexpensive to construct and verify, and in many applications should be non-parallelizable. Non-parallelizability of puzzles is an especially important property since clients can involve other processors at their disposal e.g., to inflate their problem-solving performance claim.
A number of puzzles have been proposed [45] , but these proposals are either efficient and parallelizable [24, 49] or non-parallelizable and inefficient (typically in result verification) [13, 43, 44] . Non-parallelizable puzzles are mainly based on modular exponentiation (e.g., [43] ); in these puzzles, the verifier has to perform O(log(N )) modular multiplications to construct a puzzle instance and verify its solution. This high cost hindered the large-scale deployment of puzzles based on modular exponentiation in today's online applications [45] .
In this paper, we propose puzzles based on modular exponentiation that reduce the cost incurred on the puzzle generator in existing modular exponentiation puzzles. Our constructions are based on a reasonable intractability assumption in RSA: informally, this assumption states that it is computationally intractable to compute a small private exponent d when the public exponent e is larger by several orders of magnitude than the modulus N . It is well known that RSA is insecure when the private exponent is small and the public key e < N 1.875 [10, 50] . However, when e ≥ N 2 , RSA is considered to be secure [10, 11, 50] . Defeating this assumption would essentially imply a further restriction in the RSA problem, that has not been reported to date. Note that when e is large, the cost of encryption and/or signature verification in RSA is prohibitively high, which explains why this class of RSA keys is not widely used. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that leverages on this class of RSA keys to construct low-cost modular exponentiation puzzles. Where appropriate, we also discuss puzzle constructions based on CRT-RSA [11] .
Based on this intractability assumption, we show that the costs incurred on the generator of modular exponentiation puzzles can be considerably reduced for any exponent of choice (i.e., for any puzzle difficulty). More specifically, we provide constructions for (variable-base) fixed-exponent and variable-exponent modular exponentiation puzzles and we show that the verifier only needs to perform a modest number of modular multiplications to construct and verify these puzzles. Given a modulus N , the costs incurred on the verifier in our puzzle are decreased by a factor of |N | k when compared to existing modular exponentiation puzzles, where k is a security parameter. For example, for a 1024-bit modulus N , k = 80, the verifier's cost is reduced by a factor of 12.
As a by-product, our puzzle can be used to efficiently verify the integrity of outsourced modular exponentiations (modulo a semi-prime). We further show how our puzzle can be integrated in protocols used for remote verification of computing performance and for DoS protection. We validate the performance of our puzzle through experiments on a large number of PlanetLab nodes [1] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define clientpuzzles and we introduce our assumptions based on RSA. In Section 3, we introduce our puzzles and we provide a security proof for their constructions. Section 4 outlines some applications that can benefit from our proposed scheme. In Section 5, we overview the related work and we conclude the paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Client Puzzle Properties
Here, we state the security notions of client puzzles (adapted from [14] ).
Definition 1. A client puzzle P uz is given by the following algorithms:
-Setup is a probabilistic polynomial time setup algorithm that is run by the puzzle generator. Given a security parameter k, it selects the key space S, the hardness space T , the string space X , the puzzle instance space I and puzzle solution space P. It then selects the puzzle parameters params ← (S, T , X , I, P). The secret s ∈ S is kept private by the puzzle generator. -GenPuz is a probabilistic polynomial time puzzle generation algorithm that is run by the puzzle generator. On input s ∈ S, Q ∈ T and a ∈ X , it outputs a puzzle instance puz ∈ I. -FindSoln is a probabilistic solution finding algorithm. On inputs puz ∈ I and a run time τ ∈ N , it outputs a potential solution soln ∈ P after at most τ clock cycles of execution. -VerAuth is a puzzle authenticity verification algorithm. On inputs s ∈ S and puz ∈ I, it outputs true or false. -VerSoln is a deterministic solution verification algorithm. On inputs s ∈ S, puz ∈ I and a solution soln ∈ P, it outputs true or false.
It is required that if params ← Setup(k) and puz ← GenPuz(s, Q, a) where s ∈ S, Q ∈ T and a ∈ X , then (1) VerAuth(s, puz) = true, (2) ∃τ ∈ N such that soln ← FindSoln(puz, τ ) and VerSoln(s, puz, soln) = true.
Definition 2. (Puzzle-unforgeability.) A client puzzle P uz is UF (unforgeable) if the probability that any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary M succeeds in producingP uz, such thatP uz was not previously created by the puzzle generator and V erAuth(P uz) = true, is a negligible function of k.
Definition 3. (Puzzle-difficulty.) Let ǫ k,Q (.) be a monotonically increasing function, where k is a security parameter and Q is a hardness parameter. A client-puzzle P uz is DIFF k,Q if for all τ ∈ N, for all security parameters k ∈ N, for all Q ∈ N, the success of any adversary M, that is restricted to τ clock cycles of execution, is bounded by ǫ k,Q (τ ) in solving P uz.
Rivest's Repeated-Squaring Puzzle
In [43] , Rivest et al. proposed a non-parallelizable time-lock puzzle based on repeated-squaring to enable time-release cryptography. In this puzzle, the puzzle generator encrypts a message M into a ciphertext C as follows: C = M + X a t mod N given an integer X, an exponent a, a large integer t and an appropriate semi-prime modulus N . This computation can be performed efficiently using the trapdoor offered by Euler's function:
On the other hand, to acquire M from C, the client needs to compute X a t mod N in log(a t ) ≈ t modular multiplications. When used as a client-puzzle (e.g., [44] ), this puzzle is used such that the prover is required to compute X a t mod N given X, a, t and N . This computation is then verified by the puzzle generator through the trapdoor offered by Euler's function in O(log(N )) modular multiplications.
RSA with a Small Private Exponent
The RSA cryptosystem [42] is the most widely used public-key cryptosystem. Let N = pq be the product of two large and distinct primes and let e and d be inverses modulo φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Throughout the rest of the paper, we assume that p and q are balanced primes; that is, |p| = |q|. For k ∈ N + (N + = N − {0}), the public RSA key e and the private RSA key d satisfy:
It is known that RSA is insecure when e ≤ N 1.875 and d is small [8, 10, 15-17, 20, 23, 25, 28, 33, 38, 50] . Existing attacks on this class of "weak" RSA keys are mostly based on Wiener's attack [50] and/or on Boneh and Durfee's attack [10] . Wiener's continued fraction attack can be used to efficiently factor N when e ≤ N and d < N 1 4 −ǫ and Boneh and Durfee's lattice-based attack [10] shows that private exponents up to N 0.2929 are unsafe when e < N 1.875 . Blömer et al. [8] further generalized Wiener's attack to factor N in polynomial time for every e ≤ N satisfying ex + y ≡ 0 mod φ(N ), where x and y are short. Gao 1 and Howgrave-Graham and Seifert [30] extended these attacks to factor N given several common modulus instances of RSA with d < N 0.4 and e ≤ N .
Low-Cost Decryption in RSA
In this work, we consider RSA keys that do not belong to the weak class of RSA keys, yet enable low-cost decryption in RSA. More specifically, we consider the following class of RSA keys:
Class A: Class A is defined as the set of all RSA keys (N, e, d) where: N = pq, p and q are two large balanced primes, e ≥ N 2 such that gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1 and d is small such that ed − 1 ≡ 0 mod φ(N ).
When (N, e, d) ∈ A, the fastest known algorithm that computes d from (N, e) runs exponentially in time with |d|. This hardness assumption on class A is based on the observations of Wiener [50] and Boneh et al. [10] . When e ≥ N 2 , all known attacks against small private RSA exponent are defeated. More specifically, the continued fraction algorithm [50] , the lattice-based attack [10] and Coppersmith's attack [15, 16] fail even when d is small (for the reason why, refer to Appendix A). For example, when e ≥ N 2 , |d| ≥ 80-bits, no known feasible algorithm can compute d from (N, e) ∈ A, and therefore factor N . RSA keys that belong to A clearly do not optimize the cost of RSA encryption and signature schemes; when e is large, the cost of encryption and/or signature verification is prohibitively high, which explains why this class is not widely used in RSA.
Remark 1.
Given the work of Blömer et al. [8] , we can safely extend class A to the set of RSA keys that satisfy a generalized RSA key equation of the form ex + y ≡ 0 mod φ(N ), where e ≥ N 2 and x, y are small (for the reason why, see Appendix B). Note that a special instance of this equation is the standard RSA equation, where x = d and y = −1.
Remark 2.
One simple way to generate large public keys whose modular inverses are small is to pick d such that |d| is small, and compute e ′ = d −1 mod φ(N ). Then, a large public key e is computed from e ′ as follows: e = tφ(N ) + e ′ , where t ∈ N + and t ≈ N 2 . The verifier then deletes e ′ and publishes (N, e) [9] .
Where appropriate, we also consider in this work the following class of RSA keys: 
When (N, e, d) ∈ B, the fastest known algorithm that computes d from (N, e) runs in min( d p , d q ). The use of RSA keys in class B is suggested by Wiener [50] and Boneh [10] to speed up RSA decryption 2 . Since decryptions are often generated modulo p and q separately and then combined using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) [11] , Wiener proposes the use of a private key d such that both
The best known attack against this scheme runs in min( d p , d q ) [10, 26] .
Remark 3. Throughout this paper, we consider RSA keys in the class A ∪ B as a building block to construct low-cost puzzles based on modular exponentiation. To simplify the description and analysis of our puzzles, we consider RSA keys in A ∪ B where the public exponent e ≥ N 2 . We point out, however, that our analysis also applies for all RSA keys in A ∪ B.
Low-Cost Puzzles based on Modular Exponentiation
System and Attacker Model
We consider the following model. A verifier (puzzle generator) wants to verify that a prover performed a certain number of modular exponentiations (modulo a semi-prime) in a specified interval of time. For that purpose, the verifier requires that the prover runs a software on its machine (i.e., a modular exponentiation puzzle) for a specific amount of time. In some application scenarios, we will need to assume that the verifier and the prover can exchange authenticated messages over the communication channel. We assume, however, that the verifier does not have access to the prover's machine and thus cannot check the prover's environment; this includes the number of processors at the disposal of the prover, the connections established from the prover's machine, etc..
Verifier Prover
Compute N = pq and φ(N )
If the verification passes, the verifier accepts the puzzle solution. An untrusted prover constitutes the core of our attacker model. We assume that a prover possesses considerable technical skills by which it can efficiently analyze, decompile and/or modify executable code as necessary. More specifically, an untrusted prover has knowledge of the algorithm used for the computation and of the algorithm that is run by the verifier. We assume that untrusted provers are motivated to inflate their puzzle solving performance (i.e., untrusted provers have incentives to solve the puzzle in a faster time than what they can genuinely perform). However, we assume that provers are computationally bounded.
Low-Cost Fixed-Exponent Modular Exponentiation Puzzle
Here, we present our puzzle based on (variable-base) fixed-exponent modular exponentiation. In Section 3.3, we propose a variant puzzle based on variableexponent modular exponentiation. Our puzzle is shown in Figure 1 .
In the setup phase of our puzzle, the verifier picks two large balanced primes p and q (of sufficient size to prevent factoring of N = pq, e.g., |p| = |q| ≥ 512-bits), computes N = pq and φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Given N , the verifier also generates RSA keys (N, e, d) such that (N, e, d) ∈ A, |d| = k, where k is a security parameter or (N, e, d) ∈ B, where | min(
The verifier also picks a puzzle difficulty R ∈ N and computes K = e − (R mod φ(N )). We show later that K will enable low-cost verification of the puzzle solution. (N, R, K) are public parameters that set the puzzle hardness and s ← (e, d, φ(N )) is kept secret. Note that R needs to be larger than φ(N ) to ensure the security of our scheme 4 . Typically, R is chosen such that R ≫ φ(N ) (|R| ≥ 100, 000 bits) to achieve a moderate runtime of the puzzle (in the order of tens of milliseconds, see Section 3.4). However, even in the case where the verifier would like to e.g., simply outsource the computation of an arbitrary R ′ ≤ φ(N ), this can be remedied by setting R ← R ′ + tφ(N ), where t ∈ N + .
-Puzzle Generation: In round i, the verifier generates puz
Here, Z i is a nonce and |X i | ≥ k. In the sequel, we assume that HMAC(X, Y ) is a keyed collision-resistant pseudorandom function, where X is used as an input key.
-Puzzle Solution: Given puz, the prover computes soln ← (
Remark 4. Note that our puzzle is stateless; only a single value of the secret s ← (e, d, φ(N )) is stored by the verifier regardless of the number of puzzles (instances) that the verifier generates. All the required data to solve a given puzzle is contained in puz, whereas the knowledge of s and soln are sufficient to verify the puzzle solution soln. The uniqueness of each puzzle instance can be ensured by having GenPuz select Z i a counter and increment Z i in each puzzle instance.
Remark 5. When R = 0, the prover simply computes y 2 = X e i mod N , and the verifier verifies the puzzle solution by computing y d 2 . Such a puzzle is then based on "standard" RSA. The major limitation of this "standard" RSA-based puzzle is that the choice of the puzzle difficulty (i.e., the exponent) is dependent on the choice of d and φ(N ). This particularly hinders the construction of repeatedsquaring puzzles (e.g., [43] ) or the secure outsourcing of modular exponentiations for a given exponent.
Puzzle Construction and Verification Costs: In our puzzle, the verifier only needs to perform 1 HMAC operation (2 hashes) to construct the puzzle and a small number of modular multiplications (computing (y 2 y 1 ) d ) to verify the puzzle solution:
-(N, e, d) ∈ A: In this case, the puzzle verification is performed in O(log d) modular multiplications. When |d| = k, the verifier's cost is reduced by a factor of
k , when compared to the original repeated-squaring puzzle [43] . When |N | = 1024, k = 80, the puzzle verification cost could be as low as 3 2 80 = 120 modular multiplications 6 and the average improvement gain in the puzzle solution verification is almost 12 (i.e., , when compared to the original repeated-squaring puzzle [43] .
Prime number generation (i.e., computing N ) and the pre-computation of e and d are generally expensive operations for the verifier; however, this computation is performed only once at the setup phase 7 and (N, e, d) are subsequently used for all the puzzles generated by the verifier.
Security Analysis: To analyze the security of our scheme, we first show that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to acquire the secret s held by the verifier in our puzzle. Based on this, we show that an adversary needs to perform at least O(log R) modular multiplications to compute the solution soln to a puzzle instance puz such that VerSoln(s, puz, soln) = true.
We use the following game Exec M (k) between a challenger and a probabilistic polynomial time (p.p.t.) adversary M:
-The challenger runs Setup on input k to obtain N = pq chosen uniformly at random from N , d chosen uniformly at random from {2 k ..2 k+1 } and computes e such that (N, e, d) ∈ A ∪ B. The challenger, then stores the secret s ← (e, d, φ(N )). The challenger further picks R > N chosen uniformly at random from R and computes K as shown in Figure 1 .
-The adversary M gets to make as many CreatePuz(Z i ) queries as it likes.
In response, the challenger (1) creates puz ← (X i , Z i , R, K, N ) as shown in Figure 1 , (2) computes soln such that VerSoln(s, puz, soln) = true and (3) outputs (puz, soln).
Adversary M terminates the game by outputting an integer C. We say that M wins Exec M (k) if C ≡ 0 mod φ(N ) (i.e., if M computes a multiple of φ(N )).
In this case, we set the output of Exec M (k) to be 1 and otherwise to 0. We then define the success of M as Succ
Theorem 1. Computing a multiple of φ(N ) and, in particular, computing d given (N, e) is computationally as hard as factoring (see [40] for the proof ).
Proof. Let (N, e, d) ∈ A∪B satisfy the RSA key equation: ed−1 ≡ 0 mod φ(N ).
Recall that e is kept secret by the challenger. Since
Given Theorem 1, computing e from (R + K) is computationally as hard as factoring 8 . Since d is the modular inverse of e, d is equally the modular inverse of (R + K). More specifically, it is easy to see that since (N, e, d) ∈ A ∪ B, then (N, (R + K), d) are RSA keys in A ∪ B (since (R + K) > e). 7 Note that the computational load incurred by prime number generation equally applies to all protocols that make use of modular exponentiation or repeated-squaring (e.g., [43, 49] ).
Proof. We show that if M can compute a multiple of φ(N ) in the Exec M (k) game, then we can construct a polynomial-time algorithm that uses M as a subroutine to solve the RSA problem in A ∪ B, i.e., to computed given a public RSA key (N ,ē) where (N ,ē,d ) ∈ A ∪ B.
Let M be a p.p.t. adversary that outputs a multiple of φ(N ) in the game Exec M (k) with probability Succ M (k). In the Exec M (k) game, let R + K = e ′ . Recall that in Exec M (k), K = e − R mod φ(N ), where e is chosen uniformly at random from A ∪ B and R > N . Given this, note that e ′ > e + φ(N ) and
Then, we construct a polynomial-time algorithm E that interacts with M as follows:
-Given the public key (N ,ē), E picksR at random from {N + 1, ..,ē − N 2 }. -E computesK =ē −R and constructs a transcriptT that is composed of a number of tuples of the form (X i ,Z i ,R,K,N ,X iR modN ,X iK modN ), i ∈ N, whereX i is a pseudorandom string that has a similar distribution as HMAC(.) andZ i is a counter.
Note that sinceR >N ,
It is easy to see in this case thatK =ē 1 − (R mod φ(N )). Furthermore, sinceē 1 ≡ē mod φ(N ), then d is a modular inverse ofē 1 . We point out that sinceē 1 =ē − t 1 φ(N ) =ē −R + (R mod φ(N )), thenē 1 >ē −R ≥ N 2 , since by constructionR ≤ē − N 2 . Therefore, (N ,ē 1 ,d) ∈ A ∪ B. Given this, it is easy to see that the view of M when run as a subroutine by E is distributed identically to the view of M in the game Exec M (k). Recall that in Exec M (k), X i is a pseudorandom string, K = e − R mod φ(N ), where e is a secret such that (N, e, d) ∈ A ∪ B and (N, R + K, d) ∈ A ∪ B.
Therefore, if M can compute a multiple of φ(N ) in the Exec M (k) game, then it can solve the above RSA problem. By the hardness assumption on A and B, it is computationally infeasible for M to computed, or equivalently a multiple of φ(N ) (Theorem 1), from (N ,ē) when (N ,ē,d) ∈ A ∪ B. Therefore, Succ M (k) is negligible, thus concluding the proof.
Given this, we can show that our puzzle construction is both unforgeable (UF) and difficult (DIFF k,R ).
Corollary 1. The puzzle construction of Figure 1 is UF.
Proof Sketch: Given a puzzle instance puz ← (X i , Z i , R, K, N ), VerAuth(s, puz) = true if and only if
Therefore, the only viable way for M to constructp uz ← (X i ,Z i , R, K, N ) such that VerAuth(p uz) = true andp uz,X i ,Z i were not previously created by the challenger is to construct (X i ,Z i ) such thatX i ← HMAC(d,Z i ). Since HMAC(.) is a pseudorandom collision-resistant function, M cannot construct (X i ,Z i ) without the knowledge of d. Following from Lemma 2, the success probability for M in acquiring d from our puzzle -and therefore constructingp uz such that VerAuth(p uz) = true -is bounded by O(2 −k ). Figure 1 is DIFF k,R .
Corollary 2. The puzzle construction of
Proof Sketch: Following from Lemma 2, it is computationally infeasible for M to compute a multiple of φ(N ) given our puzzle. Furthermore, M cannot pre-compute the solution of the puzzle since it cannot predict X i (|X i | ≥ k) nor the outcome of y 2 y 1 (since e is kept secret by the verifier).
The fastest known way for M to solve our puzzle is to compute y 1 and y 2 correctly. Modular Multiplication is an inherently sequential process [43] . The running time of the fastest known algorithm for modular exponentiation is linear in the size of the exponent. Although M might try to parallelize the computation of y 1 and/or y 2 , the parallelization advantage is expected to be negligible 9 [43, 44] . Note that M might try to perform the computation of y 1 and y 2 , in parallel, using different machines at its disposal. In typical cases, R ≫ K; this means that the computation of y 1 and y 2 requires at least O(log R) sequential modular multiplications. We point out that the verifier can prevent the separate computation of y 1 and y 2 , by sending K to the prover once it receives y 1 (see Figure 2) .
M can equally try to compute y 1 and/or y 2 through intermediate results that it previously computed (or intercepted) (e.g., when the base X i is the result of a multiplication of two previously used numbers). This also applies to the original time-lock puzzle proposed in [43] ; this can be remedied, with high probability, by setting |HMAC(.)| ≫ |Z i |.
Given this, the success of M -restricted to τ clock cycles of execution -in solving our puzzle is bounded by ǫ k,R (τ ) = min(⌊
to perform at least τ = log(R) clock cycles of execution to solve our puzzle.
Low-Cost Variable-Exponent Modular Exponentiation Puzzle
In some settings, the verifier might need to change the puzzle difficulty (i.e., the exponent) "on the fly" (e.g., when subject to DoS attacks). We briefly discuss how this can be achieved based on the proposed fixed-exponent puzzle. 9 M might try to parallelize the multiplication of large numbers by splitting the multiplicands into smaller "words" and involving other processors in the multiplication of these words. Further details about this process can be found in [36] . However, this attack incurs a significant communication overhead that prevents an M from gaining any substantial speedup; given a large number of squaring rounds, the RTT between the cooperating processors needs to be in the order of few nanoseconds to achieve even a modest speedup. 10 The probability that any number is coprime with d is 6 π 2 ≈ 0.61. Therefore, only two choices are sufficient, on average, to create such a vi (i.e., if gcd (HMAC(d, Xi) ), d) = 1, then with high probability gcd (HMAC(d, Xi+1) ), d) = 1).
Verifier Prover
Given k, compute (N, e, d) ∈ A ∪ B Set s ← (e, d, φ(N )) Pick an arbitrary Ri > e such that 
mod. mul. Table 1 . Construction and Verification Costs of Puzzles. "Mod. Mul." denotes modular multiplication and "Mul." refers to multiplication. B-Puzzle and A-Puzzle refer to our proposed puzzle created using classes B and A, respectively, of RSA keys.
the security of our puzzle. Otherwise, M can compute a multiple of φ(N ) solely from R i and
When (N, e, d) ∈ A and R i > e such that [10, 50] , there exists no polynomial-time algorithm that can factor N in this case [27] .
Similar to Corollaries 1 and 2, it can be shown that the puzzle construction of Figure 2 is UF and DIFF k,Ri . Table 1 summarizes the costs incurred in our puzzles when compared with those in the repeated-squaring puzzle of [43] . To the best of our knowledge, there are no other proposed non-parallelizable puzzles that are based on modular exponentiation.
Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our puzzle, we implemented it in JAVA on four different workstations. We evaluate the performance of our scheme on various other processors in Section 4.2. In our implementation, we used built-in JAVA functions for prime number generation, repeated-squaring using addition chains, etc.. While a faster implementation of our scheme could be achieved using lower-level programming and/or specialized hardware or software, we aim to demonstrate in this work the feasibility of our proposal using available standard algorithms and programming tools. Our findings (Table 2) show that our schemes considerably reduce the cost incurred on the generator of modular exponentiation puzzles.
# Squaring Puzzle Runtime Verification Time Verification Time Verification Time (Size of R in bits)
A Table 2 . Implementation results on four different workstations equipped with Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T7500 processor running at 2.20 GHz. Here, N is 1024-bit composite integer, k = 80. We conducted our measurements over the LAN (max RTT = 100 ms). Our results are averaged over 10 distinct measurements. The puzzle verification time is interpolated from the number of squarings per second on each machine.
Applications
Efficient Resilience to DoS Attacks
A natural application of our puzzles lies in the area of protection against DoS attacks. In this context, an online server requires that its clients solve our puzzles before attending to their requests in order to prevent DoS attacks. When used in DoS protection, it is important, however, that the server ensures that puzzle instances and solution pairs are used only once. To achieve this, the server should filter out resubmitted correctly solved puzzles and solution pairs [14, 32] . In our case, the storage is minimized since the server can simply store the hash of the nonce Z i that corresponds to the most recent solved puzzle (where Z i is a counter). The verifier will then accept to verify only recent puzzles.
Remote Verification of Computing Performance
To cope with the advances in processing power, the computing community is relying on the use of benchmarks. While several benchmarks [2, 13, 19, 44] were proposed as a mean to evaluate a processor's computing power, most of these benchmarks are parallelizable (see Section 5) .
Based on our variable-exponent puzzle (Figure 2 ), we construct a secure benchmark that enables any machine (even with modest computation power, e.g., a PDA device) to remotely upper-bound the computing performance of single-processors. Our benchmark differs from the puzzle in Figure 2 as follows: upon reception of y 1 , the verifier estimates the number of squarings per second: S = Ri T2−T1 of the prover's machine. This estimate is accepted by the verifier if, after receiving y 2 at time Figure 2 , the success of a p.p.t. adversary M in inflating the number of squarings that it can perform per second by more than a small ǫ is negligible.
Corollary 4. Given the puzzle depicted in
Proof Sketch: Recall that our puzzle is UF and DIFF k,Ri . Therefore, the only viable method for M to inflate its performance claim is to sendȳ 1 , chosen at random, ahead of time, compute y 1 correctly and distribute the computation of Our protocol finds applicability in a multitude of application domains. For example, our benchmark can be used in online distributed computing applications (e.g., [3] ) or in the secure ranking of supercomputers (e.g., [4] ) to prevent possible frauds in performance claims 11 . We evaluated our benchmark on various processors running on 12 different PlanetLab nodes [1] (refer to Section 3.4 for implementation details). Our findings (see Table 3 ) suggest that our proposed benchmark reflects well the performance of various processors.
Related Work
Client puzzles found their application in several domains (e.g., prevention against DoS attacks [21, 48] , protection from connection depletion attacks [32] , protection against collusion [41] ). Several computational puzzles have been proposed in the recent years [43, 45, 49] . However, most of these puzzles are parallelizable; a comprehensive survey of existing client puzzles can be found in [45] . In [43] , Rivest et al. proposed a non-parallelizable puzzle based on repeated-squaring to enable time-release cryptography. The drawback of this scheme, if used for DoS protection, is that it incurs an expensive cost on the puzzle generator. Wang et al. propose in [47] a scheme that enables the server to adjust the puzzle difficulty in the presence of an adversary whose computing power is unknown. In [14] , Chen et al. provide a formal model for the security of client-puzzles. In this work, we use their model as a building block for analyzing the security of our proposed puzzle. Several other contributions address the problem of secure outsourcing of computations to untrusted servers (e.g., [7, 12] ). Clarke et al. present protocols for speeding up exponentiation using untrusted servers in [46] . In [29] , Hohenberger et al. describe a scheme to outsource cryptographic computations where the verifier can use two untrusted exponentiation programs to assist him in the computations. Memory-bound puzzles were proposed in [22, 37] to overcome the limitations of existing computational puzzles. However, memory-bound puzzles cannot entirely substitute their computational counterpart e.g., in applications where the client's memory is limited (e.g., PDA devices) or to evaluate the computing performance of devices, etc.. Other protocols for creating secure benchmarks to evaluate a machine's computing performance were also proposed [44] ; these benchmarks can however be easily parallelized [18, 34, 39] .
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed low-cost fixed-exponent and variable-exponent puzzles based on modular exponentiation. Given a modulus N , the costs incurred on the verifier in our puzzle are decreased by a factor of |N | k when compared to existing modular exponentiation puzzles, where k is a security parameter. Our constructions are based on a reasonable intractability assumption: essentially the difficulty of computing a small private exponent in RSA (or CRT-RSA) when the public key is larger by several orders of magnitude than the semiprime modulus. As a by-product, our puzzle can be used to efficiently verify the integrity of outsourced exponentiations modular a semi-prime. We further showed how our puzzle can be integrated in a number of protocols, including those used for the remote verification of computing performance of devices and for protection from DoS attacks.
A Cryptanalysis of RSA with Large Public Key and Small Private Exponent
Consider an RSA system (N, e, d), where N = pq, p and q are large primes, and e ∈ N + such that e ≥ N 2 , gcd(e, φ(N )) = 1 and d is small. Recall that in RSA, In [50] , Wiener describes a cryptanalytic attack on the use of an RSA private key d < N 0.25 , when e < pq. The attack makes use of an algorithm based on continued fractions that finds the numerator and denominator of a fraction in polynomial time when a close enough estimate of the fraction is known. This will enable the retrieval of a multiple of φ(N ), which will equally result in the factoring of N [40] . The convergence of the continued fraction algorithm is guaranteed when kd < . When e ≥ N 2 , k ≥ dpq. Substituting k = dpq in the equation above yields d < 1. More generally, when e > N 1.5 , Wiener's attack will fail since the continued fraction algorithm will not work for any size of the secret exponent d [50] .
A.2 Resilience to the Lattice-based Attack
Boneh and Durfee [10] describe a scheme that solves the RSA small-inverse problem when e < N δ and d < N α . As shown in [10] , this attack is a heuristic that applies Coppersmith's techniques [15] to bivariate modular polynomials and can only succeed when α < The main intuition behind the attack in [8] is to estimate In what follows, we show that these attacks are defeated given several common modulus instances of ex + y ≡ 0 mod φ(N ) with e ≥ N 2 . Let (N 1 , e 1 ), (N 2 , e 2 ), be two instances of RSA, then there exists k 1 , k 2 ∈ N + such that:
e 1 x 1 = −y 1 + k 1 φ(N ) e 2 x 2 = −y 2 + k 2 φ(N )
Guo's main observation is that these equations can be combined to remove φ(N ) as follows k 2 e 1 x 1 − k 1 e 2 x 2 = k 1 y 2 − k 2 y 1 .
With this equation as a starting point, the attack then proceeds in a similar way as Wiener's continued fraction attack:
Given Theorem 2, this suggests that Howgrave-Graham and Seifert's attack [30] combines Wiener's, Boneh's and Guo's attacks to factor N given r ≥ 2 instances of RSA with common modulus. When e i > N 2 and e i > N e j , ∀i = j, their attack will equally fail given any number of common modulus instances 12 .
